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PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF
BAILMENT PROOF
EDWARD BRODY.EY*
In a single breath I propose to say that burden of proof and pre-
sumptions, as applied to bailment, are confusing yet overly simplified;
confusing in that the courts repeatedly make all manner of conflicting
statements as to the applicable rules, overly simplified to the extent that
they invoke and rely upon the doctrine that a bailor makes out a prima
facie case against his bailee by showing the delivery of the goods to the
bailee plus a failure to return them or their return in a damaged condi-
tion upon demand. It is hoped that some of these propositions may be
here at last partially clarified.
Obviously, it will be impossible in an article of this brevity to discuss
proof in every type of bailment case, that is, in suits by bailors against
bailees, in suits by bailees against bailors, in suits by either bailors or
bailees against third persons, and in suits by such third persons against
either bailors or bailees. We shall have to content ourselves presently
with an analysis of the principles governing burden of proof in the
typical bailment case where bailor sues bailee to recover for the loss of,
theft of, or damage to the bailed chattel.
In addition, it should be stated that there are no magic formulae or
hard and fast rules as to the admission or exclusion of evidence in bail-
ment cases or in the conduct of the trial, this entire area, like many
others, being controlled in large part by the sound discretion of the
trial judge, operating within the precedent of established type situations
and principles of public policy.
I
EVIDENCE CONTROLLED BY PLEADINGS
To start with, it is basic that closely akin to the problems of burden
of proof and presumptions in a bailment case are those of pleading,
since under the general evidentiary rules relating to relevance, a bailor
who does not plead well or well enough in his suit against his bailee is
not going to be allowed to offer evidence on the issue. Objection will be
sustained or a demurrer to his petition will be allowed. And by the same
token, he will not ordinarily be permitted to supply proofs which go
beyond the allegations of his pleading.
In this connection, a recent Nebraska case, Federal Insurance Com-
pany v. International Harvester Company,' which may have changed
the law of that state, held that where the petition of a bailor in an action
*Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Member of the Illinois Bar.
1164 Neb. 698, 83 N.W. 2d 382, 385 (1957).
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to recover for damages caused by fire to the subject of such a bailment
while in the custody of the bailee does not allege that negligence of the
bailee was the proximate cause of the damage, it does not state a cause
of action and is demurrable ore tenus. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
said:
Appellant does not in its petition plead a case of non-return of
the property, the subject of the bailment, or damage thereto in
an unknown manner but appellant goes further and alleges the
property was damaged in a definite manner, that is, by a fire,
which alone does not give rise to any presumption of negligence
of the bailee. [Citing cases.] In such a situation the litigant
claiming a right of recovery from a bailee must allege negligence
on his part as to the proximate cause of the damage. The petition
does not allege that negligence of the appellee was the proximate
cause of the fire or of the damage to the tractor. It does not state
a cause of action against the appellee and the court properly dis-
missed the case.
The case decided that plaintiff's failure to allege negligence was fatal.
It left unanswered the two questions: (1) whether, had negligence been
alleged generally, without any specification of particular negligent acts,
dismissal could have been avoided, and (2), had the pleading contained
a general charge of negligence, whether plaintiff would have been forced
to adduce evidence of negligence before he could rest his case.
As opposed to the foregoing, the case of Travelers Insurance Com-
pany v. Hulnze,2 a res ipsa loquitur case to recover for the fire loss of
an automobile, discloses that the petition filed therein contained only
general allegations of negligence and the trial court overruled a motion
to make this pleading more definite and certain by setting forth in what
manner the defendant or his agents and employees failed to exercise
proper care in handling the automobile, and by stating the particular
acts of negligence relied upon by plaintiff. It follows that in a res ipsa
case, a general declaration of the defendant-bailee's negligence should
suffice.
And in Threlkeld v. Breaux Ballard,3 in which plaintiff's petition
stated only that the damage to her bailed automobile was caused by the
negligence of the defendant or his employees within the scope of their
employment, and plaintiff testified only that she left her car with the
defendant for a greasing and oil change, where it was damaged by fire,
and another witness for plaintiff proved the extent of the damage, and
rested, the Court agreed with plaintiff's contention "that the allegation
of negligence contained in the petition was unnecessary and surplusage
and it became unnecessary for her to prove such unnecessary allega-
tion.... ." The Court observed:
The foreign authorities dealing with the question involved are
2 168 Kan. 483, 213 P. 2d 645 (1950).
3 296 Ky. 344, 177 S.W. 2d 157, 158 (1944).
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conflicting, one line of authorities tending to support the con-
tention of plaintiff and another one tending to support the [op-
posite] contention of defendant.
As a result, it cannot be said that the law is settled as to whether
plaintiff must plead the defendant's negligence and if so whether gen-
erally or particularly. Apparently, much depends on the form and theory
of the action and the precedent in the jurisdiction.
II
THE INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF
Seemingly most courts in all jurisdictions agree that a bailment case
is the same as any other type of action where the onus probandi or
burden of persuasion is placed upon the proponent, who is usually the
plaintiff, since he has the affirmative of the issue. If, at the conclusion
of the trial, the evidence is so in equipoise that the jury cannot say on
which side the truth lies, a situation which rarely obtains in practice,
the plaintiff or bailor will be the loser.'
In Hildebrand v. Carroll,5 which involved the bailment of a horse,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said:
The request and the instruction given fairly raised the question
frequently referred to in the books as to the "burden of proof"
in cases of this kind. The general rule in actions for negligence
is that the burden of proof is upon the party asserting it ...
In speaking of the relative duties and obligations of bailors and
bailees, some confusion has arisen in the books as to the burden
of proof to establish negligence. Technically speaking, that bur-
den always rests upon the plaintiff. But there are certain classes
of bailments, when the property is in the exclusive possession
of the bailee, and the property is returned damaged, in which
it is said the law casts upon the bailee the burden of showing
that the loss did not occur through his negligence. The authorities
are by no means harmonious on this question. The ancient rule
and older decisions are to the effect that the loss or injury raises
no presumption of negligence. The more modern decisions hold
that the proof of loss or injury establishes a sufficient prima facie
case against the bailee to put him upon his defense. 3 Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 750, and cases. It is not our pur-
pose to review or attempt to reconcile these decisions. This court,
never having passed upon the rule properly applicable to the
facts in this case, feels at liberty to adopt one that will fully
meet its requirements, and still preserve harmony in the law of
negligence. We therefore hold that when the bailment is such
that the property is in the exclusive possession of the bailee,
away from the bailor, and the property is returned in a dam-
aged condition, and it is shown that the injury is such as does not
ordinarily occur without negligence, proof of these facts es-
tablishes a prima facie case ... [that] the law will then presume
4 Clemenson v. Whitney, 238 I1. App. 308 (1925), and cases cited.
5 106 Wis. 324, 327-28, 82 N.W. 145, 146 (1900).
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negligence to have been the cause, and casts upon the defendant
the burden of showing the loss did not occur through his negli-
gence....
While it is agreed that the bailor has the burden of proof in showing
that the loss in question was the result of the bailee's negligence, it is
stated that the bailor need not plead or show specific acts of negligence
by the bailee. 6 A bailor makes out a prima facie case of negligence as
against the bailee, by showing that the goods bailed have not been re-
turned on demand.
7
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in the case of Milwaukee
Mirror & Art Glass Works v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry Co.,8 where a
sample case was checked in a railroad baggage room:
There is no evidence of any gross negligence, and the evidence
of ordinary negligence is meager. However, where goods are
stored with a common carrier or warehouseman, and there is a
failure to deliver upon proper demand, the owner need not show
specific acts of negligence to make a prima facie case entitling
him to recover. To escape liability, the burden is cast upon the
defendant to show that the failure to deliver did not result
through any negligence on its part. [Citing cases.]
And, of course, if the bailor-plaintiff, in making out his own case,
shows that the defendant-bailee was not negligent, he has not only failed
to make out a prima facie case, but has placed no burden whatever upon
the defendant to go forward with the evidence.9 Whenever such bailor
alleges the specific acts of the defendant constituting negligence, he
must prove those acts.
III
WHAT IS A "PRIMA FACIE CASE"?
However, in deference to the views of the courts so expressed, and
in complete lip service to their several formulae for making out a prima
facie case, it is submitted that these can neither be understood nor ap-
plied without a definition of terms. Do the courts mean by prima facie
case that the plaintiff has made out enough of a case to go to the jury,
one quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to cause reasonable minds
to differ as to the outcome so as to warrant but not require decision,
or do they mean by the term that the case is not just strong enough to
go to the jury but so strong as to require a directed verdict for the
proponent in the event the defendant does not see fit to go forward with
6 Contra: Federal Insurance Company v. International Harvester Company,
supra note 1.
7 Lindor v. Burns, 292 
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the evidence? In other words, when the bailor has shown delivery and
a failure to return on demand, has he placed his case in the second or
in the third stage of judicial hospitality as explained by the great
Wigmore?
Modern cases seem unanimously to hold that once the bailor has
made out his prima facie case, he has not caused the true burden of
proof of risk of non-persuasion to shift to his adversary, but only the
burden of proceeding, but they almost uniformly fail to make clear
what is the consequence of the failure of the bailee to offer evidence
of his diligence. Is the penalty intended to be a summary ruling for the
bailor whereby the bailee is thrown out of court qua that issue or is it
simply a matter of the judge charging the jury that they may infer that
the bailee is negligent if they so desire,--in other words that such a
prima facie case warrants decision but does not require it? The courts
apparently do not act uniformly in this area, and one would suspect that
no little misunderstanding is occasioned by reference to the "presump-
tion" of negligence so created. If, indeed, it is a true presumption in
the sense of a mandatory but rebuttable inference, it would of course
be sufficient not only to carry the case to the jury, but, if unopposed,
to remove all question of fact and require a directed verdict. On this,
Professor McCormick writes:
When a bailor proves delivery of the property to the bailee in
good condition and return in a damaged state, or a failure to
return after due demand, a presumption arises that the damage
or loss was due to the negligence or fault of the bailee. This
presumption is mandatory.'0
In the case of Bowman v. Vandiver," which was a suit to recover
for damages to rented road equipment, the Court said:
In the present case the court peremptorily instructed the jury to
find for plaintiff the reasonable cost of repairing the scarifier.
This instruction was proper in the absence of evidence on the
part of Bowman & Martin showing that it was damaged with-
out their negligence.
Again, in Hogan v. O'Brien,2 an action against a garage keeper for
loss of plaintiff's automobile through theft, the Court said by way of
dictum,
.. in default [of such proof], the bailor is entitled, as a matter
of law, to a verdict in his favor.
And in Traminell v. Whitlock,' 3 it was held that where the bailee of a
trailer gives an explanation of the damage to the trailer inadequate to
10 McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §309 (1954).
11243 Ky. 139, 47 S.W. 2d 947, 948 (1932).12 212 App. Div. 193, 208 N.Y.S. 477, syl. 3 (1925).
'3 150 Tex. 500, 242 S.W. 2d 157, syl. 6 (1951).
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exculpate him of negligence, the bailor is entitled to an instructed ver-
dict on that issue.
Truly, the foregoing is little more than academic, since the pre-
sumption of the bailee's negligence which arises from the bailor having
made out a prima facie case rarely stands unopposed, and whenever
evidence is adduced by the bailee tending to exonerate him from lia-
bility, it would seem that the matter of his fault should properly be
left to the jury. 4 It could even be urged that all directed or instructed
verdicts should be avoided and the question of the bailee's negligence
uniformly be left to the jury, even when it stands uncontradicted, inas-
much as the plaintiff's prima facie case will almost invariably depend on
the testimony of witnesses and it is no mere rigamarole to state that all
questions of their credibility are for the jury.
IV
APPLICABILITY OF THE "RES IPSA LOQUITUR" DOCTRINE.
The question of what action the court should take when the bailor's
prima facie case stands unopposed is further complicated by the in-
sistence of many courts on deciding the case on the theory of res ipsa
loquitur. It is to be noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not
really applicable to a large number of bailment cases. The rule states,
quite simply, that when there is an instrumentality (such as a machine)
in the exclusive control of the defendant, which when properly used
does not result in damage, yet damage is shown to have occurred without
fault of the plaintiff, the law "presumes" that the defendant was negli-
gent. It would appear that a very considerable number of bailment cases
do not really involve such an exclusively controlled instrumentality at
all, for example it seems illogical to equate an automobile parking lot
to a machine and certainly the car itself, which was the subject of the
damage there, should not be considered in that category. But we should
not forget that the classic example of res ipsa loquitur was the case
of a barrel of flour rolling out the window of a warehouse and inflicting
injury on a passerby.
In any event, it was held by Mr. Justice Pitney in Sweeney v.
Erving,15 a case involving injury to a patient from an x-ray machine,
that ordinarily ". . . res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occur-
rence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an
inference.... ." To the same effect see Levine v. Union & New Haven
Trust Co.,' 6 March v. Henriksen,17 and Prosser, The Procedural Effect
of Res Ipsa Loquitur.'8
'4 Capitol Dairy Co. v. All States Auto Body Builders, Inc., supra note 7;
Lederer v. Railway Terminal & Warehouse Co., 346 Ill. 140, 178 N.E. 394(1931).
15228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913).
16 127 Conn. 435, 17 A. 2d 500, syl. 2 (1941).
17213 Minn. 500, 7 N.W. 2d 387, syl. 2 (1943).
1s 20 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1936).
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Professor McCormick observes 9 that, "Even under this view as to
the normal procedural effect of the doctrine, it is recognized that the
circumstances in the particular case may make the inference irresistible,
and entitle the plaintiff to a directed verdict when his evidence is not
refuted by counter-proof. [Citing Alabama V. .Ry Co. v. Groome20
and Prosser on Torts. 1 ]." But even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
gives rise to no more than an inference sufficient to carry to the jury the
matter of the bailee's negligence vel non, it is suggested that in a bail-
ment case its procedural effect should be different from, say, a personal
injury suit. "Prosser argues that the mandatory effect should be accorded
only in cases such as those of carriers and bailees where policy justifies
imposing special responsibility." 22
So it would seem that it makes little difference whether or not a
bailment is analyzed on the basis of res ipsa loquitur, except as the
analysis affects the symmetry of the law, since in either case the bailor's
unopposed prima facie case would probably require summary disposition
by a directed verdict in his favor. It is to be noted, nevertheless, that
there is ample precedent in the books for classifying the "presumption"
of res ipsa loquitur, even as applied to a bailment case, as only a per-
missive inference, as in the case of Echinger v. United Mutual Fire In-
surance Company, 23 where the opinion reads :24
But while we believe that the evidence presented a prima facie
case upon which the court could have found negligence on the
part of the bailee, we also believe that such evidence did not
compel such a finding.
V
WHAT MAKES OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE?
So if we now know what happens to a bailor who fails to make out
a prima facie case against his bailee, namely that a verdict is directed
against him, and what befalls a defendant who fails to oppose such a
showing, namely the probability of a directed verdict against him, we
should next ask what it takes (1) to make out a bailor's prima facie
case, and (2) what it is necessary for the bailee to show to avoid a
directed verdict against him and to insure the case getting to the jury.
The question of what makes out a prima facie case by a bailor,
as heretofore stated, has been unduly over-simplified, at least from the
standpoint of a practitioner who must actually do so in court. le is
led to believe that if he shows the bailment, a failure to redeliver or
the damaged condition, and the demand where one is necessary, he can
19 MCCORmicK, EVIDEzc §309, n. 23 (1954).
20 97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703. 704, syl. 6 (1910).2 1 McCoRmicK, EviDENcE §309, n. 23 (1954).
22 Ibid.
23 D.C. Mun. App., 61 A. 2d 725 (1948).
24Id. at 726.
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then sit back and enjoy his laurels, as his victory will be instantly pro-
claimed. This may be true, but first he must adduce evidence of each
of these elements. And even then, he must offer evidence of the extent
of his damage, if he expects to recover anything.25 No so-called pre-
sumption will operate to excuse him on this score. In the Tannhaeuser
case last above cited, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated :26
The defendant takes the position that, in the absence of substan-
tial performance by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's breach bars it
from recovering anything from the defendant. However, 5 Wil-
liston, Contracts (rev. ed.), p. 4118, sec. 1473, states there is an
increasing tendency by courts in recent years not to apply such
harsh rule, but to permit a plaintiff, who has substantially
breached a contract, to recover in those situations where the de-
fendant would be unjustly enriched if recovery were denied. This
court has adopted this more lenient rule.... [Citing cases.] How-
ever, in order for the plaintiff to recover anything on such theory
in the instant case the burden was upon it to prove how much
the unlighted sign had benefitted the defendant.... This burden
was entirely unmet by the plaintiff as it assumed that it was
entitled to the full contract rental unless the defendant proved
some damage under its counterclaim. This assumption on plain-
tiff's part was entirely erroneous absent the finding that it had
substantially performed its contract. [Emphasis supplied.]
It would accordingly appear that a court will not guess what damage the
bailor has sustained through the bailee's negligence.
But to revert to a consideration of the elements of the bailor's prima
facie case, viz. the delivery, the failure to redeliver and the demand,
how are these to be shown and by whom? It is respectfully submitted
that it is not enough for a bailor to show that some vaguely described
chattels belonging to him found their way into the hands of the bailee.
He must, in the first instance, make a showing of what particular, spe-
cific chattels these were. Of course, if the entire controversy is over the
theft of a single automobile from the bailee's premises, there is no
special problem. The bailor simply testifies that he delivered the
car to the bailee's lot or garage for storage or repair and that when
he asked for it, it was missing or damaged. However, when the
subject matter of the bailment is many things, as in the case of an
inventory of a business or a stock of goods on hand under a con-
tinuing arrangement between a manufacturer and an artisan employed
to process same, the artisan receiving goods from the bailor daily and
currently returning those completed, the problem of the bailor estab-
lishing what goods were in possession of the bailee at any given time
becomes more complicated, involving access to inventories, summaries
25 Win. G. Tannhaeuser Co. v. Holiday House, Inc., 1 Wis. 2d 370, 83 N.W. 2d
880 (1957).
26 1 Wis. 2d 370, 376-77, 83 N.W. 2d 880, 884 (1957).
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and other evidence. And it is the duty of the bailor to show what was
in the hands of the bailee at the time of the casualty in question.
Even in the simpler situations where a single chattel is bailed, it is
often necessary to show precisely its characteristics, as its size, weight,
color or otherwise, without which it will be difficult or impossible
to determine whether or not the bailee has been negligent or has
fulfilled the terms of the contract of bailment. In this regard, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of Parish v. Gihmore,2 said:
[T]he difficulty with the case is, that the testimony does not
show that the defendant did not cut the garment as long as the
cloth would admit of. It is assumed on the part of the plaintiff
that there were two yards of cloth in the piece, and that from
that quantity of cloth the cloak might have been cut longer
than it was. But there is no positive evidence in the record that
there were two yards in the piece .... As the plaintiff did not
prove the fact that there were two yards of cloth in the piece,
he failed in the most material part of his case ...
It is further stated that the bailor must adduce evidence of the
failure on the part of the bailee to redeliver the chattel to him, in
order to make out a prima facie case. This should not be impossible
to do in a case such as his depositing a suitcase in a checkroom, where
his own testimony that he asked for it and the bailee failed to produce
the bag, would suffice. However, in the complicated situation above
suggested, where the bailor receives daily redeliveries of many items
from the bailee, it may be doubted that his categorical and conclusory
assertion on the stand that the bailee has failed to return numerous
specific items to him would be enough to take the issue to the jury.
To require more than his bare assertion on his part would, naturally,
be placing on him the burden of proving a negative, a difficult burden
at best, but by no means unknown in the law. He could, by appropriate
discovery procedures, ascertain what receipts of his the bailee holds
for such redeliveries, offer these in evidence as a part of his own
case and thereafter wait for the defendant to show the return of other
material. This should be no different or more difficult than proving
any other negative, such as the plaintiff's freedom from contributory
negligence, that an insured did not commit suicide or that there is no
such person as the signatory to a check. And while evidence of how
damage befell the bailed chattel may be peculiarly within the knowl-
edge and control of the bailee, so as to justify a court in requiring the
bailee to go forward with the evidence on this point, the same cannot
be said as to whether or not the subject matter of the bailment was
returned to the bailor. This would seem to be shared information.
As to the requirement that a demand for his chattel be shown
27 33 Wis. 608, 610-11 (1873).
1962]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
by the bailor, we forsee no difficulty on this score for two reasons:
first, a demand is not always required, and where the substantive law
does not insist upon one the court would not, and secondly, there are
many decisions that demand is made by the filing of suit, which ought
to fulfill the requirement in this case.
VI
WHAT CONSTITUTES A PRIMA FACIE DEFENSE?
Now it is incumbent to consider what the bailee must do, once
the bailor has made out a prima facie case, in order to make out a
prima facie defense and avert a peremptory ruling by the court against
him. Some years ago, it was more common than it is today to find
courts taking the position that once a bailor has made out a case suffi-
cient to go to the jury, the burden of proceeding, or the evidentiary
burden, shifts to the bailee who, if he shows the nature of the casualty
or what happened, is excused from the danger of a peremptory ruling
against him and is not required to show affirmatively that the loss
was not occasioned by his negligence. He was not required either to
produce evidence of his due care or to convince the jury that he was
diligent. He had made out a prima facie defense, causing the burden
of proceeding to shift back to the plaintiff-bailor, who then had the
duty of adducing evidence as to the respect in which the bailee was
negligent and ultimately of inducing belief in the minds of the jury
that the defendant was at fault. That style of thinking is generally not
in fashion today, most courts making the bailee go forward sufficiently
to show not only the cause of the loss or damage but that it occurred
without his fault, since the mere nature of the occurrence would not
necessarily exonerate him from negligence, and this would seem to
be the better rule.
The early case of Sanborn v. Kimbcdl,28 which was a suit over the
death of a horse in the hands of a bailee, is representative of the
thinking at that time. In it the Court said :29
It is settled in this state, whatever the doctrine may be else-
where, that in an action of negligence against a bailee, not a
common carrier, the general burden of proving negligence rests
upon the plaintiff. If he proves the bailment and a failure to
return on demand, he has ordinarily made a prima facie case,
and it is then incumbent on the bailee to explain the cause of the
refusal, as by showing the loss of the property by fire or theft,
or its injury by accident or otherwise. It then devolves upon the
plaintiff to show that such fire or theft or accident was due to
the failure of the bailee to use such a degree of care of the
property as under the circumstances the law requires. The final
28 106 Me. 355, 76 Atl. 890 (1910).
29 Id. at 890-91.
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burden is on the bailor to prove negligence, not on the bailee to
prove due care. [Citing cases.]
Illinois appellate courts have held both ways on this problem in
the past. Some took the position that the bailee was exonerated when
he showed the cause of the loss, leaving the burden of showing the
bailee's negligence to the bailor.30 Others insisted that the bailee go
forward sufficiently not only to disclose the casualty or other fact
but to negative the possibility of his own negligence. 31 In the case of
Rhodes v. Warsawsky,3 2 the Court said in the opinion :33
But it is also the rule that where the failure to deliver is ex-
plained by the fact appearing that the goods bailed have been
stolen or destroyed by fire, and the bailee is no longer able to
deliver them, the law will not presume negligence and the onus
or burden of proving the same is upon the bailor.
It is to be noted, at this juncture that the case of Cummins v. Wood,
cited in Rhodes, does not support the alleged rule, as will hereinafter
appear. Opposed to the above quotation from the Rhodes case, above
cited, the case of Scherb v. Randolph Wells Auto Park, Inc. recites :34
... In Clemenson v. Whitney, 238 Ill. App. 308 [opinion by Mr.
Justice Thomson] the court reviewed the Illinois authorities
from Cummins v. Wood, 44 Ill. 416, 92 Am. Dec. 189. The
opinion states: 'Of course the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to prove his or her case, and it remains there throughout the
trial and never shifts to the defendant. That is true on the issue
of negligence in a bailment case. But when the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case, as is done in a bailment case merely
by showing the delivery of the bailed goods to the bailee and fail-
ure of the latter to return them on demand or delivery in a dam-
aged condition, then the burden of proceeding with the evidence
falls on the defendant and remains there until the plaintiff's
prima facie case is overcome. The real question is, what must
the defendant show, in order to overcome the prima facie case
of negligence made out by the plaintiff? Is it sufficient to show
the bare fact that the bailed articles have been burned up or
stolen while in the bailee's possession? Obviously not. They
may have been lost in either of those ways by reason of the
gross negligence of the bailee himself or his servants. If the
bailed articles have been burned up or stolen while in the bailee's
possession, the prima facie case made out by the plaintiff's
proof that the bailee has failed to return the articles upon de-
mand is not met or overcome unless the bailee shows that the
fire or robbery was not due to his carelessness or that he has
30 Rhodes v. Warsawsky, 242 Ill. App. 101 (1926).
31 Scherb v. Randolph Wells Auto Park, Inc., 301 Ill. App. 298, 22 N.E. 2d 796
(1939).32 Rhodes v. Warsawsky, supra note 30.
33 Rhodes v. Warshawsky, supra note 30, at 105-106.
34 Scherb v. Randolph Wells Auto Park, Inc., supra note 31, at 300-301, 22 N.E.
2d at 797-98.
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exercised the degree of care called for by the nature of the bail-
ment. The reasons for that rule are clearly set forth by our
Supreme Court in the Cummins case and we have already
quoted them. [Emphasis supplied.]
This difference in the views of the several appellate courts in Illinois
on the subject of how far the bailee must go forward, was finally
settled, after the Supreme Court granted a certificate of importance
in the case of Byalos v. Matheson.3 5 In the last cited case, the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the view that if the bailee shows that the goods
were lost, stolen or destroyed by fire, the burden of showing negli-
gence on the part of the bailee is on the bailor and held that before
the bailee is relieved from liability, he must show that the loss, theft
or destruction by fire was not the result of any negligence on his part.38
As the Illinois courts have now resolved their differences as
to how far a bailee must go forward with the evidence in these situa-
tions, by compelling him to prove his freedom from negligence as well
as just showing fire, theft, or mysterious disappearance, it seems a
little strange, at this late date, to find courts in scattered jurisdictions
still insisting that it is enough if the bailee show the casualty alone.
It seems patent that a bailor is no better able to demonstrate the
respect in which the bailee was negligent after he learns that the goods
were destroyed by fire than he was before that knowledge reached
him. Consequently, cases like Fox Chevrolet Sales, Inc. v. Middleton,7
we submit, with deference to the learned court and counsel, seem unduly
technical and ill advised. There an automobile belonging to the plaintiff
was stolen from a repair shop. The Court said, in relevant part:
The parties are in accord as to the law which controls the case.
• . . when the loss or injury is accounted for as having been
occasioned by a cause which would excuse the bailee, such as
a burglary of his premises, then the defense is complete, unless
the bailor follows by showing that the bailee, by the exercise
of ordinary care and diligence might have avoided the loss or
injury. The burden of proving negligence never shifts from
the plaintiff. He must prove the delivery, the bailment and the
failure to return; thereupon it is incumbent upon the bailee to
explain that failure. If he does so, the bailor must prove that
the bailee failed to use ordinary care and diligence to safeguard
such property and that his failure to perform that duty caused
the loss. [Citing cases.]38
It is difficult to appreciate that a defense against negligence is
complete by showing theft, for even if the bailee is not an insurer,
35 243 Ill. App. 60, aff'd, 328 Ill. 269, 159 N.E. 242 (1927).
36 Oscar Heyman & Bros. Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 301 Ill. App. 340, 346, 22
N.E. 2d 776, 778-79 (1939). See also, Till v. Material Service Corp., 288 Ili.
App. 103, 5 N.E. 2d 769 (1937) and Lindor v. Bums, supra note 7.
3 203 Md. 158, 99 A. 2d 731 (1953).
as Id. at 732-33.
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the theft could be due to his negligence. However, under the specific
evidence introduced by the defendant in this case, which included
a showing that there was no watchman on duty the night of the theft,
it is possible that the plaintiff could have assigned such failure as
negligence. We do not think that courts which today support the rule
that the bailee has proceeded far enough by showing the theft, fire,
or loss, mean to say that a bare statement of such cause will suffice.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that all controversy with respect to
the foregoing is now tempered in the light of the -ule, or perhaps it
should be called the exception, established by the Collard case, a cause
celebre. In Royal Ins. Co. v. Collard Motors,39 being a suit to recover
for the destruction by fire of the bailor's automobile in bailee's re-
pair shop, the Court reviewed the decisions holding that a bailee is not
an insurer and may avoid liability by showing that the goods were
burned whereupon "the burden again shifts to the shoulders of the
bailor to show that the fire was caused by the bailee's negligence."
The Court announced:
But running through those decisions, there is in each a clear
intimation that the cause of the fire and its general nature gave
prima facie evidence of absence of fault on the part of the
bailee, and in none of them do we find facts such as we notice
here where there was no general conflagration. Here the fire
originated entirely within the bailee's premises; it was limited
in its scope -confined entirely not only to the interior of the
premses solely within the control of the bailee, but, in fact, to
the sole and single object which formed the subject of the bail-
ment. It would indeed do violence to the reasons on which is
established the general rule contended for by the defendant to
extend the rule to such facts. To do so would give to any bailee
an "open sesame" whenever, through his carelessness, property
entrusted to him might be burned. He could merely point
to the fire and say, "I know nothing about it," and rest secure,
requiring the bailor, with the hardihood to persist in his claim,
to prove that there had been negligence on the part of the
bailee, which, having no knowledge whatever of the real facts,
of course he could not do .... 40
Accordingly, the Court held that the bailee was required to prove his
freedom from fault in such case. The decision is followed today and
appears to be closely related to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
More impressive are the decisions which place upon the bailee
the true burden of affirmatively demonstrating to the jury that the
defendant was free from fault. The facts of Hoel v. Flour City Fuel &
Transfer Co.41 were similar to those in the Fox Chevrolet case, above,
but the Court held:
39 Ct. of App. La., 179 So. 108 (1938).
40 Id. at 110.
4' 144 Minn. 280, 175 N.W. 300 (1919).
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In Rustad v. Great N. Ry Co. 122 Minn. 453, 142 N.W. 727,
we had the question of the liability of the railway company
defendant as a warehouseman for the loss of property in its
possession. We held that the burden of proof was upon the
defendant to show that the loss did not come from its negli-
gence; that this burden was not merely the burden of going
forward with proofs, nor a shifting burden, but a burden of
establishing before the jury that its negligence did not cause
the loss; and we referred with approval to Dean Wigmore's
statement that the question of where the burden of proof should
rest is "a question of policy and fairness based on experience
in the different situations." .. . and we expressed the view that
the rule adopted was the practical working rule .... 42
Judge Dibell, who wrote the opinion, explained:
The plaintiff knew nothing and could know nothing of
the circumstances of [the car's] disappearance. The defendant
was paid for furnishing storage which carried with it the duty
of giving some measure of care. It had men in charge of the
garage giving attention to its patrons and their property. It
was or should have been in possession of such circumstances
as could be disclosed relative to the loss.43
Again, in Illinois there are some cases which indicate that the courts
intend to allocate the true burden of persuasion on the issue of the
bailee's negligence to the bailee himself, but these pertain mostly to
the innkeeper relationship. 44
In sum, there is little doubt that the prevailing rule places upon
the bailee the duty of going forward with the evidence far enough
to exonerate himself from negligence, which he cannot do simply by
showing that there was a fire or theft or mysterious disappearance,
and in some instances the bailee is made to satisfy the jury upon that
point, and such is the better rule.
VII
OTHER PROBLEMS OF BAILMENT PROOF
There remain a few additional considerations which must be men-
tioned if one is to view practically the problems of bailment proof.
First among these is the question of whether or not the contributory
negligence of the bailor is a defense in his action against the bailee.
Generally, it can be said that in business type bailments for the mutual
benefit of bailor and bailee, the contributory negligence of the bailor
is no defense to the negligence of the bailee. 45 However, Professor
42 Ibid.
4 Hoel v. Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 280, 175 N.W. 300 (1919).
See also, Peet v. Roth Hotel Company, 191 Minn. 151, 253 N.W. 546 (1934).
44 Burton v. Drake Hotel Co., 237 Ill. App. 76, 84 (1925) ; Rockhill v. Congress
Hotel Co., 237 Ill. 98, 102, 86 N.E. 740, 741 (1908).
45 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §85 (2d ed. 1955).
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Brown 6 notes in his well-known work on personal property that
"if the bailor knows as well as the bailee the risk that is to be run,
the latter may be relieved of liability on the ground that the bailor
either assumed the risk, was contributorily negligent, or else had
entered into an implied agreement exempting the bailee from losses
due to those risks of which the bailor was cognizant."47 And in mutual
benefit bailments involving a guest's baggage lost or damaged in the
hands of an innkeeper, it is frequently held that the burden cast on
the innkeeper to exonerate himself may be met by showing that the
loss was caused by the personal negligence of the guest or someone for
whom the guest was responsible.4 In those instances where the bailor's
contributory negligence affords the bailee a defense, the question of
who must show that contributory negligence is believed to be largely
governed by the local rules of the jurisdiction, but by and large this
is something for the defendant to show after plaintiff has made out
his prima facie case.
The Wisconsin comparative negligence rule, when applied to other
fields such as personal injury, permits a plaintiff who is also to
blame for a personal injury sustained by him due to the negligence of
the defendant to recover nevertheless, which is not allowed under the
law of other states. But there would not appear to be any reason to
suppose that this rule was intended to displace the general law of bail-
ment which makes the acceptance of the bailment by the bailee who is
thereafter negligent a "deceit" upon the bailor.
As to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence adduced, it is said49
that general rules control, and that in actions between a bailor and
his bailee, as in civil actions generally, plaintiff should prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the essential elements of his cause of
action50 and it is for the jury, or the court in a bench trial, to say
whether or not the evidence is sufficient to induce a truth saying.51
4 6 Ray Andrews Brown, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
4 7 BRoWN, PERsoNxA PROPERTY §85 (2d ed. 1955).
48 Rockhill v. Congress Hotel Co., supra note 44.
49 8 C.J.S. Bailnents §52 (1938).
50 Roberts v. Minier, 240 Ill. App. 518 (1926).
518 C.J.S. Bal'ments §52 (1938) ; Venne v. Damrow Bros. Co., 192 Wis. 249, 212
N.W. 796, 798 (1927).
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